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ARTIC]~E 
Hanclling Cases of Willful Exposure 
Thro'ugh HIV Partner Counseling 
and ]~eferral Services1 
James G. llodge, Jr., J.D., LL.M. * and Lawrence O. Gostin, J.D., LL.D. 
(Hon.)** 
L INTRODUCTION 
In December, 1998, the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued 
comprehensive guidelines on partner counsel-
ing and referral services (PCRS) for individuals 
living with HIV/AIDS.2 Though the terminol-
ogy has changed, PCRS is based on partner no-
tification/ the traditional public health practice 
of assisting individuals infected with a commu-
nicable disea~e in notifying their sexual and/or 
needle-sharing partners of the real or potential 
exposure to C.isease.4 As part of a comprehen-
sive public health strategy (including testing 
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center; Assistant Scientist, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health; Project Director, the Center for 
Law and the Public's Health at Johns Hopkins and 
Georgetown Universities. 
**Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; 
Professor of Publ ic Health, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health; Director, the Center for Law and 
the Public's Hec.lth at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown 
Universities. 
1. This article is substantially based on a report of the 
same title prepan!d by the authors with funding assistance 
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
While this scho: arly report discusses CDC and other 
governmental policies and procedures, it does not represent 
an official positi:m of these governmental entities. The 
authors would like to thank the following individuals who 
expertly reviewed and commented on an initial draft of the 
report on which this article is based: Ronald O. Valdiserri, 
David Holtgrave, Robert N. Kohmescher, David W. Purcell, 
Dan Riedford, David Brownell, John Miles, Rick Steketee, 
services, screening of sub-populations, report-
ing of cases of infectious disease, and medical 
interventions for those infected),5 PCRS offers 
significant public health benefits for individuals 
living with HIV/AIDS, their partners, and the 
community.6 Persons who may be unaware of 
their risk are informed of their potential expo-
sure to HIV.7 Notified partners are advised to 
test for HIV and counseled about practicing 
safer behaviors to avoid future exposure.8 
Those who choose to test and are found to be 
infected can pursue early medical treatment 
Terje Anderson, Lisa Speisseger, Robert Berke, Shepherd 
Smith, Roland Foster, Scott Burris, Chris Collins, Helen Fox 
Fields, Sean Bugg, Jeff S. Crowley, Beth Meyerson, Douglas 
Morgan, Deborah von Zinkernagel, Brian McCormick, Julio 
C. Abreu, Miguelina Maldonado, and Marilyn C. Moses. 
They are also grateful to Mira Burghardt (JD Candidate, 
Georgetown University Law Center) for her research 
assistance. 
2. Dlvs. OF HIV/AIDS PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HIV PARTNER COUNSELING 
AND REFERRAL SERVICES - GUIDANCE (Dec. 30, 1998) 
[hereinafter DHHS & CDC]. 
3. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing 
the Veil of Secrecy in HIVIAIDS and Other Sexually Trans-
mitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner 
Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 9,12-13 (1998). 
4. Id. 
5. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at ii. 
6. Id. at § 1.4. 
7. Id. at § 1.2. 
8.Id. 
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(which may substantially prolong their lives),9 
practice preventive behaviors, and reduce their 
own risk of becoming infected with other sexu-
ally-transmitted diseases.lO At the community 
level, PCRS (in coordination with other public 
health programs) can improve disease surveil-
lance, identify high risk social sexual networks, 
and contribute to the development of compre-
hensive public health programs to lower HIV 
transmission rates. 11 
PCRS begins when individuals seek HIV 
counseling or testing through private care prov-
iders or publicly funded programs. 12 These in-
dividuals (or "clients") are offered professional 
counseling services to assess and reduce their 
risks of acquiring or transmitting HIV.13 Clients 
are encouraged to volunteer specific informa-
tion about their sex and needle-sharing part-
ners, and to plan how and when partners are in-
formed of their risk of exposure.1 4 Either the 
client or the PCRS provider informs each lo-
cated partner of his or her possible exposure to 
HIV.IS Newly-informed partners are referred to 
counseling, testing, and necessary social and 
medical services, thus completing the PCRS cy-
cle. 16 
PCRS typically follows instances of infec-
tion resulting from unknowing or unintended 
exposure to disease. However, partner counsel-
ors or public health authorities may discover 
9. See A. Mark Isley, Health Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 981, 997 (1994) (noting that HlV -infected individuals 
can "live and function longer with the disease") (citing Ar-
thur S. Leonard, Ethical Challenges of HIV Infection in the 
Workplace, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 53, 63 
(1990». See also Mike Cooper, AIDS Deaths Drop for 1st 
Time, U.S. Attributes 12% Decline in First Half of 1996 to 
Better Treatment, Slowing of Epidemic, S.F. EXAM'R, Feb. 27, 
1997, at Al (stating that experts also attribute the decline to 
broadened access to effective treatment and care). 
10. As the CDC suggests in its report, PCRS serves two 
primary goals: (1) providing services to HIV-infected persons 
and their sex and needle-sharing partners so they can avoid 
infection or, if already infected, can prevent transmission to 
others; and (2) helping partners gain earlier access to individ-
ualized counseling, HIV testing, medical evaluation, treat-
ment, and other prevention services. DHHS & CDC, supra 
note 2, at § 1.2. 
11. ld. at § 1.4. 
12. Id. at § 1.5. 
13. Id. 
14. Ideally, partners are prioritized (i.e. current spouses 
and other sexual partners are notified before previous sexual 
partners) and (1) informed of possible exposure to HIV; (2) 
provided accurate information about HIV transmission and 
prevention; (3) informed of the benefits of knowing one's 
serostatus; (4) assisted in accessing counseling, testing, and 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 23:452001] 
that a client or other person poses some danger 
of exposing others to HIV and is not willing to 
avert thqt risk. For example, a PCRS counselor 
may be aware that a person who knows he is 
infected with HIV has engaged or is presently 
engaging in unsafe sexual or needle-sharing ac-
tivity with partners who are unaware of the 
risk.17 This information may be apparent from: 
(1) counseling sessions with clients engaging in 
such unsafe practices; (2) interviews with clients 
who are partners of persons engaging in such 
unsafe behaviors; or (3) information provided 
by health care workers, mental health workers, 
or law enforcement authorities. ls 
In its PCRS Guidelines, CDC does not 
fully address these cases of "willful exposure" of 
HIV. For the purposes of this article, we define 
"willful exposure" as the intentional act of a 
competene9 individual infected with HIV to ex-
pose others to HIV through unsafe sexual or 
needle-sharing practices?O Our definition is in-
tentionally narrow and meant to apply only to 
individuals with HIV who knowingly engage in 
certain risky or high risk behaviors. Thus, will-
ful exposure does not necessarily involve HI V-
infected individuals who (1) are unaware of 
their infection and thus unknowingly expose 
others to HIV; (2) unintentionally expose others 
to HIV (e.g. due to a faulty condom); (3) lack 
understanding of the consequences of their 
other support services; and (5) cautioned about revealing 
their own or others' serostatus. [d. at § 3.3. 
15. Id. at § 3.2. 
16. [d. 
17. Id. at § 3.4.2. 
18. Id. 
19. Whether an individual (e.g. a minor, a person with a 
mental disability or substance abuse problem), is competent 
for the purposes of the definition of willful exposure is a sep-
arate determination in accordance with state laws. 
20. The willful exposure of others to HIV may occur in 
many different ways. Individuals with knowledge of their 
HIV infection may donate contaminated blood or other bod-
ily fluids. The national screening of blood donations for HIV 
has largely eliminated the risk of willful exposure through 
blood donations. Individuals may also attempt to infect 
others through biting, spitting, or splattering of blood. Al-
though criminal charges have been brought against individu-
als with HIV who engage in these behaviors, factual and epi-
demiologic evidence have regularly demonstrated the low 
risks involved in these contexts. Individuals with knowledge 
of their HIV infection may also willfully expose others to in-
fection through unsafe sexual or needle-sharing practices. 
These are cases which PCRS counselors and public health de-
partments are likely to face and thus, our definition of willful 
exposure focuses almost exclusively on these instances. 
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risky actiom: (e.g. those with a substantial 
mental disabl1ities); (4) expose competent part-
ners who as'Sume the risks (i.e. partners are 
aware of the HIV status of the individual and 
the potential risks associated with exposure); or 
(5) may knowingly expose others to HIV, but 
are not morally responsible for such exposures 
(e.g. victims of domestic abuse, rape, or incest, 
or minors engaged in commercial sex work)?l 
Thus, cases of willful exposure (as we define 
them) involve knowledgeable, competent, in-
fected individuals who intentionally try to infect 
unknowing partners. 
Often th~se unsuspecting partners may be 
heterosexual women?2 A well-publicized case 
of willful exposure in Chautauqua and sur-
rounding cou.nties in New York in 1998 in-
volved an inc,ividual who allegedly had unsafe 
sex with multiple female partners (most of 
whom were minors) despite knowing he had 
HIV and that HIV was transmissible to others 
21. While these examples do not fit within the definition of 
willful exposure ;et forth in this report, specific guidance 
concerning public health responses to such examples should 
be consulted. Sa NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR LOCAL AND STATE DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH STAFF, RESPONDING TO CONTINUED SEXUAL 
RISK AND NEEDLE-SHARING RISK BEHAVIOR ON THE PART 
OF PERSONS KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO BE AWARE OF BEING 
INFECTED WITH HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) 
(Draft as of March 21, 1999). 
22. See DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at § 3.3. 
23. Brian A. Brown, The Charge Is Murder, The Weapon 
AIDS, WALL ST. L, Nov. 3, 1997, at A23; Shannon Brownlee 
et aI., AIDS Comes to Small-town America, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Nov. 10, 1997, at 52; Jennifer Frey, Nushawn's 
Girls, WASH. POST, June 1, 1999, at Cl. For an epidemiologic 
review of this case, see Cluster of HIV-Positive Young Wo-
men-New York, i997-I998, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. (May 28, 1999), at 413. 
24. These charges included (1) attempted assault in the sec-
ond degree (on th,! theory that he intended to cause serious 
physical injury to ~thers by engaging in unprotected sex de-
spite knowing such behavior could infect others); and (2) 
reckless endangerment in the first degree (on the theory that 
he acted with depraved indifference to human life by having 
unprotected sex). 
25. Frey, supra 110te 23, at Cl. 
26. See HIV-infected Woman Slept with 50 Men, WASH. 
TIMES, July 31, 19')8, at A13. 
27. See Kristina Sauerwein, Man's Deadly Legacy Triggers 
Frantic Race, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 11, 1997, at 
AI. 
28. See Phillip :vtorris, An Unlikely Bearer of HIV and 
Words of Warning, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 11, 2000, at 9B. 
see also Kevin Mayhood, Boy, 15, Faces Felony Charge After 
Spitting in Officer'1· Pop, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 3, 2001, 
at OAl. 
29. See, e.g., Continued Sexual Risk Behavior Among HIV-
Seropositive, Drug- Using Men Atlanta; Washington, D. c.; and 
through unsafe sexual practices?3 After public 
health and law enforcement authorities con-
ducted their own investigations, a suspect was 
detained in New York City and later pleaded 
guilty to criminal charges of reckless endanger-
ment (among others).24 At least a dozen wo-
men in Chautauqua County alone were infected 
with HIV through this single individua1.25 Simi-
lar cases have been documented in Tennessee,26 
Missouri,27 and other states?S 
Countless other documented and undocu-
mented cases of willful exposure exist. Numer-
ous studies suggest that some individuals in-
fected with HIV who know they are infected 
continue unsafe sexual or needle-sharing behav-
iors?9 While these studies vary in the percent-
ages of unprotected and undisclosed exposures 
found among individuals in differing popula-
tions, they cumulatively reveal a significant pat-
tern of risk behaviors?O The impact of this pat-
tern may be accentuated among heterosexual 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1993,45 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 151, 151 (1996) (study of 116 HIV-seropositive 
and illicit drug users revealed that 28% reported having vagi-
nal or anal sex without a condom in past 30 days, 32% had 
not disclosed their serostatus to all partners, and 63% had 
partners of unknown or negative serostatus); William W. 
Darrow et aI., Impact of HIV Counseling and Testing on 
HIV-Infected Men Who Have Sex with Men: The South Beach 
Health Survey, 2 AIDS AND BEHAV. 115 (1998) (29% of 
HI V-seropositive men had engaged in unprotected insertive 
anal intercourse in past year with partners with HIV negative 
or unknown HIV status); Christine J. De Rosa & Gary 
Marks, Preventive Counseling of HIV-Positive Men and Setf-
Disclosure of Serostatus to Sex Partners: New Opportunities 
for Prevention, 17 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 224 (1998) (77% of 
HI V-seropositive men with HIV-unknown status partners 
failed to disclose their infection prior to sexual practices); 
Jeffrey D. Fisher et aI., Dynamics of Sexual Risk Behavior in 
HIV-lnfected Men Who Have Sex with Men, 2 AIDS AND 
BEHAV. 101, 106 (1998) (research findings based on surveys 
and interviews suggest that risky behaviors occur with some 
frequency); Carol F. Kwiatkowski & Robert E. Booth, HIV-
Seropositive Drug Users and Unprotected Sex, 2 AIDS AND 
BEHAV. 151, 156 (1998) (47% of HI V-positive, sexually-ac-
tive injection drug users (IDUs) reported having unprotected 
sex in past 6 months); Lisa R. Metsch et aI., Continuing Risk 
Behaviors Among HIV-Seropositive Chronic Drug Users in 
Miami, Florida, 2 AIDS AND BEHAV. 161, 167 (1998) (ap-
proximately one-third of HIV-positive injectors and one-half 
of HIV-positive non-injectors continue to have unprotected 
sex and approximately one-third of HIV-positive injectors 
are continuing to engage in risky injecting practices). 
30. Furthermore, many of these studies are based on self-
reported actions of individuals with HIV. Actual rates of un-
safe behaviors may be higher. Although it is critical from the 
public health perspective to know the serostatus of partners 
with individuals with HIV, this information is often un-
known. Some studies have begun focusing on HIV-seroposi-
tive individuals' actual behaviors and knowledge of partner 
HeinOnline -- 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 48 2001-2002
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women31 (especially minorities )32 where rates of 
HIV infection have escalated despite lowering 
rates of infection among other groups in the 
past decade.33 HIV/AIDS remains among the 
leading causes of death among women between 
the ages of 25-44,34 many of whom are infected 
through partners for which they are unaware of 
their HIV status?5 
Cases of willful exposure reveal the ex-
isting and future risks to the public health (es-
pecially women) which may be presented by in-
dividuals who willfully expose others to HIV 
through unsafe sexual or needle-sharing behav-
iors. In response to a documented case of willful 
exposure, a PCRS counselor or other public 
health official may, in his or her professional 
judgment, decide to act to avert a legitimate 
public health threat to known or unknown per-
sons in the community. Yet handling such cases 
raises difficult issues in law, ethics, and public 
health practice. 
Public health authorities may be unable or 
ill-equipped to successfully control risks of this 
type for several reasons: (1) they may lack suffi-
cient resources to properly investigate these 
cases;36 (2) they may lack knowledge or jurisdic-
tion over the individual who willfully exposes 
others to HIV once his behaviors extend into 
serostatus. Additional epidemiological work in this area, 
however, remains to be done. 
31. See Center for Disease Control National Center for 
HIV, STD and TB Prevention - Divs. of HIV/AIDS Preven-
tion, 12 Surveillance Rep. Estimated female adult! adolescent 
AIDS incidence, by exposure category and year of diagnosis, 
1997, 1998 and 1999, U.S., available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
hiv/stats/hasr1201l figlO.htm (last modified Dec. 6, 2000). 
32. See Center for Disease Control National Center for 
HIV, STD and TB Prevention - Divs. of HIV/AIDS Preven-
tion, 12 Surveillance Rep. Estimated female adult! adolescent 
AIDS incidence, by exposure category and race/ethnicity, di-
agnosed in 1999, and cumulative totals through 1999, U.S., 
Surveillence Rep. 12, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/ 
hasr1201ltable 21.htm (last modified Dec. 6, 2000). 
33. See CDC, HIVIAIDS Among US Women: Minority 
and Young Women at Continuing Risk [available at http:// 
www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/factslwomen.htm] (last modified Jan 
31,2001) [hereinafter, HIV/AIDS Among US Women]: 
HIV infection among U.S. women has increased signifi-
cantly over the last decade, especially in communities of 
color. ... [I]n the United States, between 120,000 and 
160,000 adult and adolescent females are living with 
HIV infection, including those with AIDS. [From 1992-
1998] ... a growing proportion of women were living 
with AIDS, reflecting the ongoing shift in populations 
affected by the epidemic. In 1992, women accounted for 
14% of persons living with AIDS-by 1999, the propor-
tion had grown to 20%. In just over a decade, the pro-
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 23:45 2001] 
other communities;37 and (3) they are bound to 
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive infor-
mation they obtain from PCRS?8 How do 
health care workers and public health depart-
ments balance the duty to maintain the privacy 
of public health information related to PCRS 
against their obligation to fulfill a partner's 
right to know of their exposure to infection? 
What are the legal powers and duties of public 
health departments to protect the health and 
safety of individuals as part of their mission to 
protect the public health? What is the role of 
the criminal law concerning persons who may 
intentionally or knowingly attempt to infect 
others with HIV or other communicable dis-
eases? 
This article addresses these legal and ethi-
cal questions which PCRS counselors and pub-
lic health departments must assess in respond-
ing to these encounters. In PART II, we 
examine issues underlying the tension between 
the right to privacy of sensitive health data and 
the right to know about risks of which an indi-
vidual is unaware. PCRS attempts to resolve 
this tension by disclosing exposure-related in-
formation to partners to the extent possible 
without infringement of the infected individ-
ual's autonomy and privacy. Legal and ethical 
portion of all AIDS cases reported among adult and ad-
olescent women more than tripled, from 7% in 1985 to 
23% in 1998. The epidemic has increased most dramati-
cally among women of color. African American and His-
panic women together represent less than one-fourth of 
all U.S. women, yet they account for more than three-
fourths (77%) of AIDS cases reported to date among 
women in our country. In 1999 alone ... , women of 
color represented an even higher proportion of cases. 
While AIDS-related deaths among women were de-
creasing as of 1998, largely as a result of recent advances 
in HIV treatment, HIV/Aids remains among the leading 
causes of death for U.S. women aged 25-44. 
Id.; See also Pascale M. Wortley & Patricia L. Fleming, AIDS 
in Women in the United States: Recent Trends, 278 JAMA 911 
(Sept. 17, 1997). 
34. HIVIAIDS Among US Women, supra note 33. HIV is 
ranked as the 5th for women age 25-44 in 48 National Vital 
Statistics Report (July 24 2000) available at http://www.cdc. 
gov/nchs/fstats/deaths.htm/pdf/nvs48 11_8.pdf. 
35. See DHHS & CDC, supra note 2 (While AIDS-related 
deaths among women are now decreasing, largely as a result 
of recent advances in HIV treatment, HIV/AIDS remains 
among the leading causes of death for U.S. women aged 25-
44.). 
36. Id. § 1.3. 
37. Jd. § 2.2. 
38. Jd. § 4.3. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 49 2001-2002
Hodge and Gostin/HANDLING CASES OF WILLFUL EXPOSURE 49 
duties also suggest that PCRS counselors may 
be obliged to disclose individually-identifiable 
information to satisfy statutory duties or privi-
leges to warn or to accomplish legitimate public 
health purpmes. 
PART III briefly examines the responsibili-
ties of governmental agencies to protect the 
public health regarding cases of willful expo-
sure, as well as the circumstances in which an 
individual can be criminally prosecuted. The in-
tentional exposure of another to a communica-
ble disease is deemed a crime in most jurisdic-
tions, whether under (1) general criminal law 
(including charges of murder, voluntary man-
slaughter, involuntary or reckless manslaughter, 
assault and battery, reckless endangerment, or 
attempts of ea.ch of these crimes); (2) STD-spe-
cific offenses; or (3) HIV-specific offenses. Al-
though the use of criminal law in the interests of 
preventing the spread of any disease is gener-
ally considered contrary to public health prac-
tice, which emphasizes the ethic of voluntarism, 
and should only be a final resort, cases may 
arise where criminal sanctions are appropriate, 
even essential. 
In PART IV, we present our recommenda-
tions for the procedures and options PCRS 
counselors and public health departments 
should consider before, during, and after taking 
any action concerning cases of willful exposure. 
These include: (1) developing a public health 
plan to clarify :public health duties and responsi-
bilities; (2) creating strong protections for pri-
vacy and secu:~ity of public health information 
related to i::1.vestigations; (3) determining 
through sound investigation the existence of a 
health threat; (4) seeking legal assistance the 
moment a case of willful exposure is detected; 
(5) pre-examining the public health impact 
before any action is taken; (6) advising the sus-
pected individual before public action is taken; 
(7) choosing the least restrictive alternative 
39.Id. 
40.Id. 
41. Id. 
42.Id. 
43.Id. 
44. See MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH PRIVACY ACT 
(1999) available at www.critpath.orglmsphpa/modellaw5.htm 
[hereinafter MSPHPA]. The project was sponsored by" the 
Centers for Disea:;e Control and Prevention (CDC), the 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), the 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (AS-
needed to avert a risk to the public health; and 
(8) disclosing information about a willful expo-
sure in accordance with one of three options. 
These options include disclosing information to 
persons potentially at risk, criminal justice or 
law enforcement authorities, or, in extremely 
rare circumstances, the media. A brief conclu-
sion follows. 
II. LEGAL AND ETHICAL THEORIES 
UNDERLYING PRIVACY AND THE 
RIGHT TO KNOW 
In its PCRS Guidelines, CDC specifically 
notes the importance of maintaining the confi-
dentiality of all persons involved in PCRS?9 
CDC recommends that (1) attempts to contact 
sex or needle-sharing partners should be confi-
dential to the highest degree possible;40 (2) 
partners should be informed of their exposure 
to HIV privately;41 (3) partners should be pro-
vided only that amount of information which is 
justified, which is never to include the client's 
gender, name, or physical description, or time, 
type, or frequency of exposure;42 and (4) PCRS 
counselors must not reveal any confidential in-
formation about partners to clients.43 Preserv-
ing the security of personal information is as 
important as protecting privacy. Previously, 
CDC has issued guidelines concerning the se-
curity of HIV and other public health informa-
tion held by public health departments,44 in-
cluding protecting such data through physical 
and technological means,45 restricting access to 
those public health authorities which need the 
information, and prohibiting unnecessary han-
dling or transportation of the information.46 
Protecting individual privacy and secur-
ity,47 especially concerning sensitive health data 
like HIV status, is synergistic with accomplish-
ing public health goals.48 Respecting privacy in-
terests allows individuals to feel secure in vol-
unteering sensitive health or other information 
THO), and the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL). 
45. Id. § 5-1Ol. 
46. Id. art. V, § 5-101[b]. 
47. For definitions of privacy, confidentiality, and security, 
see LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, 
DuTY, RESTRAINT 127-28 (2000). 
48. Lawrence o. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The 
"Names Debate": The Case for national HIV Reporting in the 
United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 683 (1998). 
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about themselves or others.49 Failure to protect 
personal privacy may lead to unwarranted dis-
crimination or stigmatization against individu-
als, thus discouraging their participation in pub-
lic health efforts.5o 
Individual privacy, however, may not ex-
tend so far as to protect individuals who place 
others at risks of which they are unaware. Legal 
duties to disclose and warn of exposure to infec-
tious diseases,51 as well as ethical principles of 
beneficence (the duty to do good)52 and non-
maleficence (the duty to not harm),53 support a 
person's right to know of his exposure to HIV. 
A resulting dilemma arises from the inherent 
tension between HIV-infected individuals' 
rights to privacy and their partners' rights to 
know. 
These observations are perhaps no more 
relevant in public health practice than as ap-
plied in PCRS. PCRS encourages the disclo-
sure of exposure-related information to part-
ners,54 provided such disclosure is made without 
infringing on an infected individual's autonomy 
and privacy to the extent possible.55 Thus, 
PCRS recognizes the value of providing infor-
mation to further the right to know (of part-
ners) while protecting privacy (of individuals 
with HIV) by only disclosing non-identifiable 
data. 
Yet, at times; PCRS cannot satisfy either 
goal. Individual privacy may be compromised 
where a partner notified of exposure deduces 
the actual source. Consider, for example, a mo-
nogamous, married woman who is notified by a 
county public health department of her expo-
sure to HIV. She has not had any sexual part-
ners beside her husband for over 20 years. She 
does not inject illicit drugs. She has had "un-
safe" sex with her husband, and may affirma-
tively conclude that he must have exposed her 
49. See id. 
50. See Ferdinand Schoeman, AIDS and Privacy, in AIDS 
& ETHICS 240, 241 (Frederic G. Reamer ed., 1992). People 
infected with HIV have much to fear besides the disease. Be-
cause of the association of AIDS with promiscuity, primarily 
homosexual but also heterosexual, or the self-abandonment 
connected with intravenous (IV) drug usage, any adult with 
AIDS is suspected of degeneracy. . . . The level of public 
ignorance about the disease, the deficiency of scientific un-
derstanding surrounding aspects of its transmission, and the 
general hysteria about AIDS mean that people diagnosed as 
HIV positive must face social, economic, and medical hurdles 
no one with such dire medical prospects should have to con-
front. ... A diagnosis of HIV infection, or even suspicion of 
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to HIV, thus breaching his entitlement to indi-
vidual privacy. Although it is highly contesta-
ble whether the husband's privacy right has any 
moral priority over her right to know, the end 
result of PCRS is that his privacy interest (in 
avoiding the disclosure of his HIV status) is re-
vealed through PCRS.56 
Coextensively with a patient's right to pri-
vacy, an individual's right to know may be 
squandered where notification of exposure to 
HIV is replete of the source of the exposure. 
Think about a woman who is notified of her ex-
posure to HIV but not the source. She injects 
heroin with friends, and concludes that one of 
her needle-sharing partners must have HIV. 
She refuses to share needles in the future, but is 
oblivious to the actual source of her exposure, 
her boyfriend of two years. Although she will 
have been advised to practice safe behaviors 
(including safe sexual behaviors), she may con-
tinue to place herself at risk of exposure 
through unsafe sexual behavior due to her in-
correct assumption that her drug behaviors 
must have placed her at risk. In these scenarios, 
rights to privacy and to know are compromised 
through PCRS. 
In the following sections we explain laws 
supporting the privacy rights of individuals and 
the rights to know of their partners in the con-
text of partner notification in order to demon-
strate the fundamental tension at stake when 
PCRS counselors or public health departments 
are faced with a case of willful exposure. 
A. Legal Rights to Privacy 
Though protecting health information pri-
vacy is increasingly important within a modern 
public health information infrastructure which 
this, is sufficient in some cases to deprive people of housing, 
employment, life and health insurance, social tolerance, rou-
tine and even emergency medical treatment like mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation, schooling, social contacts, friendships, 
the right to travel in and out of countries-a social identity. 
51. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Md. App. 
1988). 
52. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCI-
PLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 259-325 (4th ed. 1994). 
53. Id. at 189. 
54. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at § 1.5. 
55. Id. at §§ 3.1.1, 4.3. 
56. See id. at § 1.5. 
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features regu.lar exchanges of health data,57 in-
dividual privacy is not necessarily paramount to 
communal interests justifying such exchanges 
and individual interests justifying some disclo-
sures. A primary communal interest underlying 
the use and disclosure of individual health data 
is the protection of public health, which, many 
suggest, cannot be thwarted through restrictive 
privacy provi5ions.58 Ideally, a balance between 
individual pri.vacy and communal interests can 
be attained through rigorous legal safeguards of 
health information,59 expressed through federal 
or state constItutional protections60 of health in-
formation, privacy legislation, or case law.61 As 
discussed in this section, however, existing legal 
safeguards are inadequate, fragmented, and in-
consistent. 
1. Constitutional Right to Privacy 
Scholars have debated the existence and 
extent of a constitutional right to informational 
privacy indepl~ndent of the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures.62 To some, judicial recognition of a 
constitutional right to informational privacy is 
particularly important since the government is a 
57. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Let-
ters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitu-
tional Law, 140 C. PA. L. REV. 1,4-5 (1991). 
58. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin and James G. Hodge, Jr., 
Genetic Privacy alld the Law: An End to Genetics Exception-
alism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 36-39 (1999). 
59. See id. at 41. The law is merely one tool to improve 
individual privacy protections. Internal privacy policies of 
health care providers, data processors, and other private sec-
tor entities which acquire, use, and disclose identifiable 
health data can greatly impact individual expectations of the 
privacy of their health information. The same can be said for 
voluntarily-execut ~d policies of governmental holders of 
data, including public health agencies, researchers, universi-
ties and academic centers, and other commissions or agen-
cies. Adherence to ethical principles and human rights docu-
ments in support c,f the privacy of individual health data may 
also lead to greater privacy protections. Ultimately, how-
ever, where government and the private sector fail to admin-
ister sufficient privacy protections, the law may guide, if not 
require, such protections. 
60. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren 
and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitu-
tional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
479, 508-09 (1990) 
61. See, e.g., Wtalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-602 (1977); 
Nixon v. Adminis':rator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 
457-65 (1977). 
62. See, e.g., Kleimer, supra note 57; Turkington, supra 
note 60; Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Pro-
tection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1991). 
63. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 57, at 4-6. 
primary collector and disseminator of health in-
formation.63 As a result, individuals need pro-
tection from the government itself without re-
sort to federal or state legislation. An effective 
constitutional remedy is the surest method to 
shield them from unauthorized government ac-
quisition or disclosure of personal information. 
Unfortunately, a right to informational pri-
vacy is not specifically provided for in the Con-
stitution.64 The Supreme Court, however, has 
judicially recognized a limited right to informa-
tional privacy as a liberty interest within the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution.65 
A flexible test has been utilized by courts 
balancing government invasion of privacy 
against the strength of the government inter-
est.66 Courts have chosen not to interfere with 
traditional governmental information collec-
tion, provided the government articulates a 
valid societal purpose and employs reasonable 
security measures.67 Unquestionably, the gov-
ernment could enunciate a valid societal pur-
pose in collection and disclosure of health infor-
mation, including enhancing public health and 
lawenforcement.68 
64. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 495-98 (1995); see also Gostin, 
supra note 58, at 42. 
65. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. 425. 
In Whalen, the Court considered "whether the constitutional 
right to privacy encompasses the collection, storage, and dis-
semination" of public health information by the government. 
See Gostin, supra note 58, at 42; see also Whalen 429 U.S. at 
591. The Court recognized "the threat to privacy implicit in 
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
computerized data banks or other massive government files." 
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. No violation was found in 
Whalen because the Court determined that the state had suf-
ficient "standards and procedures for protecting the privacy 
of sensitive medical information." Id.; see also Gostin, supra 
note 58, at 42. 
66. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 
638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit held that 
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health was 
entitled to receive the medical records of private employees 
exposed to toxic substance, subject to their informed consent. 
The court enunciated five factors to be balanced in determin-
ing the scope of the constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy: (1) the type of record and the information it contains, 
(2) the potential for harm in any unauthorized disclosure, (3) 
the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the 
record was generated, (4) the adequacy of safeguards to pre-
vent non-consensual disclosure, and (5) the degree of need 
for access (i.e., a recognizable public interest). 
67. Id. 
68. See generally Gostin, supra note 58, at 42. 
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The right to privacy under the federal and 
state constitutions is, of course, limited to state 
action. As long as the federal or state govern-
ment itself collects information or requires 
other entities to collect it, state action will not 
be a central obstacle. Even so, the constitu-
tional right to privacy, in the context of public 
health, has proven to be nominal, especially in 
instances where, as with PCRS, government 
policies protect individual privacy to the degree 
possible and individuals are not compelled to 
comply. 
2. Legislative and Administrative 
Protections 
Statutory law at the federal, state, and local 
levels protects health information privacy in va-
rious settings where information concerning 
willful exposure cases may arise, namely among 
health care workers, PCRS counselors, or STD 
or other publicly operated or funded health 
clinics. The existing level of privacy protections 
depends on the type and holder of information. 
A growing number of statutes and regula-
tions protecting privacy have been considered 
or enacted by state and federal legislatures.69 
Several statutes and regulations protecting pri-
vacy of health information have been enacted 
by the federal government. The Privacy Act of 
1974 requires federal agencies to utilize "fair in-
formation practices with regard to the collec-
tion, use, or dissemination of systematized 
records," including health data?O The Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966 requires the 
federal government to disseminate "various in-
formation 71 but exempts from disclosure several 
categories of records which include personally-
identifiable health information."n Other fed-
69. See Gostin, supra note 64, at 499-508; See also Gostin, 
supra note 58, at 43. 
70. 5 U.S.c. § 552(b)(I)-(3), (6) (1994); See Gostin, supra 
note 58, at 44. 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). 
72. Id. at § 552 (b )(6); Gostin, supra note 58, at 44. 
73. 42 U.S.c. § 290dd-2 (1994). 
74. 45 c.F.R. §§ 46.101-404 (2000). 
75. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney 
1988 & Supp. 2001) (mimics Privacy Act). 
76. See, e.g., MISS. CODE §§ 25-61-1 to 25-61-17 (1999) 
(mimics FOIA). 
77. See, e.g., CAL. Ov. CODE §§ 56 - 56.37 (West 1982 & 
Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.02.005 -
70.02.904 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001). 
78. See id. 
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eral regulations require privacy protections in 
relation to the treatment of persons for drug or 
alcohol dependency in federally-funded facili-
ties73 and the administration of human subject 
research.74 
Most states have passed privacy statutes 
that mimic the federal Privacy Aces and 
FOIA,76 and, thus, apply only to state collec-
tions of data. A few states have enacted com-
prehensive medical information privacy acts.77 
These laws provide broad protections of health 
information acquired, collected, used, or dis-
closed within the state.78 States have also 
passed disease-specific privacy laws which set 
forth stringent privacy and security protections 
for certain types of information, including medi-
cal information concerning one's HIV status79 
or other sexually-transmitted disease,8o genetic 
information,81 information utilized in medical 
research (such as state cancer registries), or 
public health information.82 
Though existing federal and state privacy 
statutes and regulations are meaningful and 
serve valuable ends, they collectively represent 
a patchwork effort to address privacy and secur-
ity concerns of individuals in their health infor-
mation. These statutes do not comprehensively 
protect health information regardless of its sub-
ject or holder. Some kinds of data are treated as 
super-confidential, while other data are virtu-
ally unprotected. Many state health informa-
tion privacy laws struggle to balance competing 
interests underlying the acquisition, use, and 
disclosure of identifiable health information be-
tween individual privacy and warranted, com-
munal uses of health information.83 Our model 
state privacy proposal, the Model State Public 
79. See Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Pri-
vacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 155 (1990) (examining state legislation dealing 
with HIV related problems in medical privacy laws). 
80. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health 
Law, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 461, 463-65 (1986). 
81. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 58. 
82. See Lawrence O. Gostin et aI., The Public Health In-
formation Infrastructure, 275 JAMA 1921 (1996). 
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-11A-2 (2001) (requiring 
health and social workers to report notifiable diseases, but 
prohibiting the use of that information for any but public 
health purposes); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.505 (West Supp. 
2001) (requiring consideration of the effects of privacy stan-
dards within health insurance on care and disease manage-
ment programs). 
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Health Privacy Act (MSPHPA)84 (which specifi-
cally concerrcs public health information), at-
tempts to rea.ch this balance by recognizing in-
dividual and communal interests in identifiable 
public health data. The MSPHPA empowers 
people to aGcess, inspect, and amend their 
health information;85 learn the ways in which it 
is used and disclosed;86 request a record of dis-
closures;87 and seek criminal or civil sanctions 
for actions ir.consistent with the ACt.88 Coex-
tensively, the Act allows public health agencies 
to acquire, collect, and use identifiable health 
information 30 long as such information is 
needed to accomplish legitimate public health 
purposes.89 Disclosures of identifiable data 
outside of public health may be made for any 
purpose with advance, written informed con-
sent,90 but for only a few, narrow purposes with-
out informed consent.91 Though states have 
failed to uniformly implement modern privacy 
protections as suggested in the MSPHPA, many 
support comprehensive national health infor-
mation privacy legislation or administrative reg-
ulations. 
Future federal health information privacy 
legislation or regulations mandated by the fed-
eral Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (HIPAA?2 may provide a 
floor for protections. HIPAA seeks to reduce 
84. See MSPHPA, supra note 44. 
8S. Id. §§ 6-101 - 104. 
86. Id. §§ 2-101 - 102, 4-108 - 109, 6-101. 
87. Id. § 4-109. 
88. Id. §§ 7-10:. - lOS. 
89. A 'legitimal e public health purpose' means a popu-
lation-based activity or individual effort primarily aimed 
at the prevention of injury, disease, or premature mor-
tality, or the promotion of health in the community, in-
cluding (a) assessing the health needs and status of the 
community through public health surveillance and epi-
demiological w:earch, (b) developing public health pol-
icy, and (c) responding to public health needs and emer-
gencies. 
Id. § 1-103(9). 
90. Id. § 4-103. 
91. Disclosures without informed consent by public health 
agencies or secondary recipients may only be made: (1) "di-
rectly to the individual;" (2) "to appropriate federal agencies 
or authorities;" (3) "to health care personnel in a medical 
emergency when necessary to protect the health or life of the 
person who is the ~,ubject of the information;" (4) pursuant to 
a court order sought exclusively by public health agencies in 
light of a clear danger to an individual or public health; (S) to 
appropriate agenc,es performing health oversight functions; 
or (6) to identify it deceased individual, determine the man-
ner of death, or provide information where the deceased is a 
prospective organ donor. Id. at §§ 4-104 - 107. 
the administrative and financial burdens of 
health care by standardizing the electronic 
transmission of health-related data.93 In addi-
tion to security provisions concerning electronic 
health information, HIPAA requires Congress 
to pass legislation setting uniform standards for 
the transmission of health insurance informa-
tion.94 While several health information privacy 
bills have been considered by Congress,95 no ac-
tion to date has been taken. 
In the absence of Congressional action, 
HIPAA requires that the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) draft and imple-
ment administrative regulations.96 While 
DHHS would prefer that Congress pass privacy 
legislation,97 the agency has issued regulations 
that may reflect the eventual national regula-
tory framework for protecting health informa-
tion privacy.98 DHHS' regulations focus on five 
key principles: (1) BOUNDARIES - health care 
information should be disclosed for health pur-
poses only (e.g., treatment, payment, or other 
health care operations), with limited excep-
tions;99 (2) SECURITY - health information 
should not be distributed unless the patient au-
thorizes it or there is a clear legal basis for do-
ing so, subject to the authorized need for infor-
mation. lOo Those who receive such information 
must safeguard it;lOl (3) CONSUMER CONTROL -
92. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
93. See id. 
94. [d. § 264; see also Jane Harman, Topics for Our Times: 
New Health Care Data - New Horizons for Public Health, 88 
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1019, 1021 (July 1998). 
9S. See, e.g., Health Care Personal Information Nondisclo-
sure Act of 1999, S. S78, 106th Congo (1999); Medical Infor-
mation Protection Act of 1998, S. 2609, lOSth Congo (1998); 
Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of 
1998, S. 1921, 10Sth Congo (1998); Medical Information Pri-
vacy and Security Act, S. 1368, 10Sth Congo (1998); Con-
sumer Health and Research Technology (CHART) Protec-
tion Act, H.R. 3900, lOSth Congo (1998); Medical Privacy in 
the Age of New Technologies Act of 1997, H.R. 181S, lOSth 
Congo (1998); Fair Information Practices Act of 1997, H.R. 
S2, lOSth Congo (1998). 
96. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
97. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON VITAL AND HEALTH STA-
TISTICS, HEALTH PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY RECOM-
MENDATIONS (1997) available at hUp:llwww.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
privrecs.htm. 
98. [d. 
99. Id. at § 164.S02 
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
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persons are entitled to know of the existence 
and purposes in which their health information 
is being used.102 They are also entitled to cor-
rect misinformation in their health records;l03 
(4) ACCOUNTABILITY - those who improperly 
hold, distribute, or use health information 
should be criminally punished, especially when 
such actions are for monetary gain. Individuals 
affected by such actions should have civil re-
course; and (5) PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY - pri-
vacy interests of individuals must not override 
national priorities of public health, medical re-
search, health services research, quality assur-
ance, health care fraud and abuse, and law en-
forcement in general. These regulations, when 
implemented in April 2003, will not preempt all 
state health information privacy laws.104 Rather, 
only those state laws which conflict with or are 
less protective of federal privacy rights would 
be preempted. State laws which are more pro-
tective of privacy, such as some disease-specific 
laws, would survive. 
3. Common Law Protections 
Modern privacy law and proposals hinge 
on a fundamental principle that identifiable 
health data be disclosed only with informed 
consent. This principle owes its inception to the 
common law duty of confidentiality of certain 
health care professionals (generally physicians) 
not to disclose health information concerning 
patients. CDC's PCRS Guidelines specifically 
adopt a duty of confidentiality between coun-
selors and clients. \05 Unwarranted disclosures 
may subject responsible parties to civil liability 
under several legal theories,106 including 
"breach of confidentiality,,,107 "invasion of pri-
102. See id. § 164.520. 
103. See id. § 164.526. 
104. Lise Rybowksi, Protecting the Confidentiality of 
Health Information, NAT'L HEALTH POL'y. F. 1, 16-17 (July 
1998), available at http://www.nhpf.org. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
106. See, e.g., McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431,436 
(S.c. Ct. App. 1997); Gostin, supra note 64, at 508-11; Gostin 
& Hodge, supra note 3, at 42-43. 
107. Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An 
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982). 
108. McCormick, 494 S.E.2d at 436. 
109. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 
793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 
674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
110. Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 532 
N.E.2d 327,331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Alexander v. Knight, 177 
A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962). 
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vacy,,,108 "breach of implied term of con-
tract,,,109 and "breach of fiduciary relation-
ship. ,,110 These duties, however, are not 
absolute. Disclosures without individual con-
sent may lawfully be made to protect third par-
ties from identifiable harm,111 to report infor-
mation for public health purposes as required 
by state law,112 or sometimes to address medical 
emergencies.113 Thus, the utility of duties of 
confidentiality in the context of PCRS is lim-
ited. 
B. A Partner's Right to Know 
While constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon law rules concerning health information 
privacy support an individual's autonomous 
right to control the disclosure of personal infor-
mation,114 these provisions, as we suggest 
above, are not absolute.115 Individual privacy 
may justifiably be limited where other persons 
have a legitimate right to know the information. 
Partner notification furthers the right to know 
despite the inevitable infringement, whether 
slight or substantial, of individual privacy. 
Though often associated with the notification of 
persons who are at risk of becoming infected 
with a communicable disease,116 "partner notifi-
cation has at least three distinct, if at times 
overlapping, meanings: (1) contact tracing (e.g. 
PCRS); (2) the duty of infected persons to dis-
close their infection to a sexual partner; and (3) 
the duty of health care providers to warn of sex-
ual and other risks to the partners of their in-
fected patients. ,,117 
The second meaning of partner notification 
(the duty to disclose) recognizes an individual's 
ethical and legal obligation to disclose his HIV 
111. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Califor-
nia, 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976). 
112. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.15.136 (Mitchie 2000) 
(allowing disclosure of information concerning persons with 
Thberculosis ). 
113. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 81.046(c) (Vernon 2001) (allowing the release of "[m]edical 
or epidemiological information ... to the extent necessary in 
a medical emergency to protect the health or life of the per-
son identified in the information"). Id. 
114. See supra II. 
115. See supra n.B. 
116. See DHHS & CDC, supra note 2. 
117. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 14. 
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infection to a sexual or needle-sharing partner 
or to reasonably protect the partner from avoid-
able health risks. Stated alternatively, if it is 
foreseeable that a person's behavior will cause 
harm to another, that person has a duty to take 
reasonable steps (or due care) to avoid such be-
havior. In this context, due care requires at a 
minimum the obligation to disclose one's condi-
tion to othen. at risk of exposure, including sex-
ual or needle-sharing partners.1lS If an individ-
ual fails to fu:.fill the duty to disclose, sexual and 
needle-sharing partners can recover tort dam-
ages through civil actions brought on theories of 
"assault or battery, fraud or misrepresentation, 
infliction of emotional distress, seduction, and 
negligence."u9 When an individual informs his 
sexual or nee dIe-sharing partners of his HIV in-
fection and the partner engages in risky behav-
iors with thelnfected individual, the partner es-
sentially assumes the risk (and consequences) 
of such behaviors. 
The third meaning of partner notification 
derives from the common law doctrine known 
as a "power or duty to warn" (more accurately 
termed the "power or duty to protect,,).120 
Through conversations with the infected pa-
tient, a physician or other health care worker 
(HCW) may conclude that certain persons are 
at risk of contracting HIV. Under the duty to 
warn, the HeW may have the power (i.e. per-
mission) or duty to inform a foreseeable third 
party of her exposure to infection if an infected 
individual reflses to inform his partner, regard-
less of whether the patient consents to such no-
118. A crucial :.ssue is whether it is reasonably foreseeable 
that sexual contact or needle sharing might harm one's part-
ner. In general, reasonable persons who know or should 
know that they have HIV must communicate this fact to a 
partner prior to sexual relations. An individual's knowledge 
of infection can be actual (an individual has specific knowl-
edge of his HIV Hatus based on, for example, a positive test 
result) or constn.ctive (an individual knew or should have 
known of his HIV infection due to his risky behaviors, early 
clinical symptom~., or other knowledge which a reasonable 
person would equate with having HIV infection). While 
courts agree that a duty to disclose follows an individual's 
actual knowledge of his infection, imposing such a duty is dif-
ficult where a pelson is specifically unaware of his HIV sta-
tus, but may be imputed to have constructive knowledge of 
infection. Most eJurts have resisted imposing a duty to dis-
close unless the person actually knows of his infected status 
since an individual with HIV may be asymptomatic for 
months or years ~:iven HIV's long latency period. 
119. See Gostir. and Hodge, supra note 3, at 38-39. 
tification.121 Even where a HCW is unaware of 
the existence of such partners, a HCW's failure 
to advise infected patients of the potential to in-
fect others is actionable negligence when 
brought by a third party infected by the pa-
tient.122 In the case of HIV infections, duty to 
warn statutes (depending on the state) typically 
require sex or needle-sharing partners to be no-
tified only if (1) there is a significant risk of 
transmission, (2) the patient cannot or will not 
contact the partner, and (3) the HCW has noti-
fied the patient of his or her intent to notify 
specified partners.123 
Where the HCW exercises a power or duty 
to warn, a breach of the duty of patient confi-
dentiality likely will occur. Significant legal and 
ethical dilemmas arise from this conflict. To 
what extent should patient confidentiality be 
sacrificed in the performance of the duty to 
warn? Many states have attempted to resolve 
this question by statutorily recognizing a privi-
lege (versus a duty) to warn others of a pa-
tient's infectious condition. "Privilege to warn" 
statutes124 differ from state to state in three key 
components: (1) the voluntariness of disclosure; 
(2) the scope of disclosure; and (3) the legal du-
ties imposed. Some statutes give HCWs the dis-
cretion to decide whether to notify a patient's 
contacts. 
For example, laws passed in California and 
New York provide that a physician may notify a 
contact if the physician reasonably believes a 
120. Christine E. Stenger, Note, Taking Tarasoff Where No 
One Has Gone Before: Looking al "Duty to Warn" Under the 
AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 471, 494 (1996). 
121. Ronald Bayer, PhD. & Kathleen E. Toomey, MD, 
MPH., HIV Prevention and the Two Faces of Partner Notifica-
tion, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1158 (1992). 
122. Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 518, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
123. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 44. 
124. In addition to modifying preexisting confidentiality 
statutes, states enacted statutes which specifically guarantee 
the confidentiality of STD or HIV status. CAL. CIv. CODE 
§ 56.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001) (protecting physician-pa-
tient confidentiality); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 120705 (West 1996) (protecting STD information); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120820 (West 1996) (protecting 
HIV information); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101 
(Mitchie 2000); 410 ILL. COMPo STAT. 50/3 (West 1997); TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (Vernon 2001). 
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significant risk of transmission exists,125 believes 
the patient will not warn the partner/26 and no-
tifies the patient of the physician's intent to 
warn the person at risk.127 Most statutes allow 
notification of spouses, sexual partners, or nee-
dle-sharing partners. 128 Some statutes limit 
warnings to an individual's spouse or cohabitat-
ing sexual partner of over one year.129 Most 
states provide immunity for HCWs who decide 
not to disclose;l3O others provide no protection 
from potential liability,131 essentially failing to 
resolve the conflict between the duty to warn 
and the duty of confidentiality. 
Even if the legal and ethical duties of 
HCWs to protect individual privacy are defined 
in some states, the role of PCRS counselors in 
cases of willful exposure is different from that 
of HCWs. Unlike HCWs who need informa-
tion for clinical purposes and are often the first 
to determine HIV status, PCRS counselors ac-
quire such information voluntarily from individ-
uals to accomplish public health purposes.l32 
While HCWs may often be private sector em-
ployees, PCRS counselors are likely state or lo-
cal government employees and thus, must up-
hold constitutional privacy and other 
protections. HCWs share a distinct relationship 
with patients from which the law and ethics 
have traditionally recognized affirmative duties. 
PCRS counselors do not "owe" clients these du-
ties under the same legal theories (although 
they may assume these duties as part of their 
public health practice). 
Like HCWs, however, PCRS counselors 
may often find themselves at the center of the 
conflict between protecting privacy and further-
ing the right to know.133 PCRS counselors are 
required to maintain the privacy and security of 
client identity under federal and state constitu-
tional, statutory, and regulatory laws.134 Yet, a 
125. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (West 
1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(a)(2) (McKinney 
1993 & Supp. 2001). 
126. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(b); 
§ 2782(4)(a)(3). 
127. Id. § 121015(b); § 2782(4)(a)(4). 
128. See, e.g., id. § 121015(a); §§ 2780(10), 2782(4)(a)(1); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-584(a) (West & Supp. 2001); FLA. 
STAT. ch. 456.061(1) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-
47(g) (2001). 
129. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.282(1)(a) 
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 2000). 
130. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 456.061(2) (West 2001); 
IDAHO CODE § 39-610(5) (Michie 1993). 
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central objective of PCRS is the notification of 
unsuspecting persons at risk of exposure to 
HIV.135 In cases of willful exposure, disclosing 
identifiable information about individuals may 
be needed to stop practices which are injurious 
to the public health for several reasons: (1) 
there may be insufficient information to allow 
PCRS counselors to directly notify partners of 
such individuals engaging in unsafe sexual or 
needle-sharing behaviors; (2) knowledge of the 
individual's identity may be critical to enabling 
unsuspecting individuals to protect themselves; 
and (3) the individual's behavior may be crimi-
nal in nature. This need to disclose identifiable 
information by PCRS counselors, however, 
must be weighed against legal and ethical duties 
to not disclose identifiable patient information 
as well as other legal interests, including the po-
tential to resort to criminal enforcement, which 
we discuss below. 
III. THE MISSION OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND CRIMINAL LAW 
Assessing the role of PCRS counselors in 
abating cases of willful exposure to HIV infec-
tion necessitates an examination of the degree 
to which such efforts are consistent with the 
mission of public health. Public health has al-
ways been primarily about the health of popula-
tions,136 as well as the health of individuals.137 
Public health has as its broadest mission the as-
surance of the conditions for people to be 
healthy.l38 Principal among the many duties en-
compassed under this directive is the control of 
threats to the health of the public,139 including 
HIV/AIDS.140 Though the federal government 
and private sectors serve critical functions, ac-
complishing these duties is quintessentially the 
responsibility of state governments pursuant to 
their police powers.141 These expansive powers, 
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(c) (West 1993); VA. 
CODE. ANN. § 32.1-36.1(A)(1l) (Michie 1997). 
132. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at § 1.5. 
133. See infra II. 
134. See infra II.A. 
135. See infra II. 
136. Gostin, supra note 48, at 688. 
137. Id. 
138. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH 35, 37-40 (1988). 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. Gostin, supra note 48, at 48. 
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reserved exclusively to the states through the 
Tenth Amendment of the federal Constitu-
tion,142 may be defined as the power of states to 
regulate in the interests of the health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare of the public.143 In 
the field of :?ublic health, state police powers 
constitute thl~ original source of governmental 
authority.144 Public health regulation is at the 
core of the police power.145 
As an important part of a comprehensive 
public health strategy to control the spread of 
HIV, PCRS is consistent with the mission of 
public health and thus, authorized via state po-
lice powers. Presumably, the mission of public 
health requires the notification of persons who 
are unknowingly at risk of infection due to the 
willful conduct of others the same as it would 
justify notification of persons at risk due to un-
intentional b~haviors. Yet, what if notification 
of at risk individuals is not possible? For exam-
ple, PCRS counselors may become aware of an 
individual engaging in risky behaviors intending 
to infect others, but the counselors may not 
know the identity of these persons. Further-
more, even if notification occurs (because those 
at risk can be identified), what should PCRS 
counselors do if they know an individual is con-
tinuing to place others at risk? Should they 
identify the individual to law enforcement au-
thorities? 
Although criminal charges against compe-
tent individuals with HIV who intentionally or 
recklessly engage in unsafe sexual or needle-
sharing behaviors with unknowing partners are 
authorized pursuant to state police powers, 
criminal prosecution in such cases is considered 
inconsistent with the public health ethic of vol-
untarism.146 Intermeshing criminal sanctions in 
areas of public health regulation undermines 
the trust that individuals ideally should have in 
public health services. 
142. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Pub-
lic Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of 
New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL'y 93, 95 (1997). 
143. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism 
and Public Health Law, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 309 (1998). 
144. Id. at 319. 
145. Id. at 323·24. 
146. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Com-
pulsory State Po~/ers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1e17, 1041 (1989). 
147. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 48. 
Without suggesting that these criminal 
measures represent an appropriate or fair re-
sponse to this or other public health issues, it is 
important that PCRS counselors and public 
health officials understand the nature of these 
potential criminal sanctions. Realistically, crim-
inal charges have previously been and will con-
tinue to be brought against individuals who will-
fully expose others to HIV and other 
communicable diseases under general criminal 
theory and STD- and HIV -specific offenses. 
The following sections review criminal charges 
potentially applicable to cases of willful expo-
sure not for the purposes of condoning such 
sanctions, but rather to explain them and the 
problems in applying criminal law to cases of 
willful exposure. 
A. Criminal Offenses Generally 
Individuals with HIV who have unsafe sex 
or share drug injection equipment without in-
forming their partners are committing a crimi-
nal act in most states. The theory of criminal 
activity varies by state and depends on the se-
verity of the individual's actions and the under-
lying facts.147 Individuals who knowingly and in-
tentionally engage in conduct risking 
transmission of HIV may be charged with a va-
riety of serious crimes, including murder, volun-
tary manslaughter, involuntary or reckless man-
slaughter, assaule48 and battery/49 reckless 
endangerment/50 or attempts at each of these 
crimes (where infection does not arise or has 
not yet resulted in the death of another).151 
Many of these prosecutions, however, have 
been brought against persons with HIV who en-
gage in violent behaviors, such as biting or spit-
ting on another, or who intentionally donate in-
fected blood.152 Few persons with HIV who 
merely engage in unprotected sex with another 
or share contaminated needles are charged with 
148. Peter Slevin, Judge Sends a Message In Assault with 
HIV, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1999, at B7. 
149. See, e.g., Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1396 
(W.D. Mich. 1993). 
150. See, e.g., Hancock v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 496, 
499 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998). 
151. Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512, 513 (Md. 1996) 
(charging defendant who knew he was HIV positive and 
raped three women, with assault with intent to murder, reck-
less endangerment, and attempted murder). 
152. Gostin, supra note 146, at 1045-48. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 58 2001-2002
58 
substantial offenses such as attempted murder 
or other intentional crimes (for many of the 
reasons discussed below). These criminal of-
fenses, however, may be brought against egre-
gious individuals who willfully expose others to 
HIV.153 
A "crime" may be defined as any inten-
tional or reckless act done in violation of duties 
which an individual owes to the community.154 
Consequently, any criminal charge requires a 
culpable mental state. In cases of willful expo-
sure to HIV, this mental state may be of two 
types: (1) intentional or knowing transmission; 
or (2) reckless or negligent transmission. 155 
Persons "intentionally" transmit HIV infection 
(or attempt to transmit if infection does not re-
SUlt) if they have the conscious objective of 
causing a harmful result, such as infection or 
death.156 For example, an individual may inten-
tionally engage in unsafe sexual or needle-shar-
ing acts with another in order to kill the person 
by infecting the person with HIV.157 Assuming 
the facts support this level of criminal intent 
(which is exceedingly difficult to ShOW),158 crim-
inal charges based on the intentional nature of 
the individual's actions may be brought. 159 Per-
sons act "knowingly" if they have knowledge of 
their infection and the modes of transmission or 
if they reasonably should have known. Individu-
als with HIV act knowingly when they are prac-
tically certain that their conduct (unsafe sexual 
or needle-sharing activity with another) will risk 
harm (HIV infection) or death to another.160 
Proving that an individual knew he was in-
fected at the time of the alleged criminal behav-
ior may be difficult. Individuals may be anony-
mously tested for HIV.161 Even when 
individuals are not tested anonymously, privacy 
and confidentiality protections of health care 
and public health information in some states 
153. See Smallwood, 680 A.2d at 513. 
154. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (5th ed. 1979). 
155. Gostin, supra note 146, at 1042-52. 
156. Id. at 1042. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 1043. 
159. Id. at 1042. 
160. See Burk v. State, 478 S.E.2d 416, 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1996). 
161. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) & 
CDC National Prevention Information Network, Under-
standing the HIV Counseling and Testing Process, at http:// 
www.hivtest.orglconsumer/indexlhtm (last visited May 28, 
2001). 
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may prohibit the release of test results for crim-
inal prosecutions. 162 Proving that an individual 
knew his actions would transmit the virus is also 
problematic. Epidemiological studies have 
demonstrated the low probabilities of HIV 
transmission through single instances of unsafe 
sexual or needle-sharing practices.163 HIV -pos-
itive individuals may assume, at times incor-
rectly, that their partners are also HIV-positive, 
thus avoiding the risk of subsequent transmis-
sion. Even when actions occur over multiple 
occasions with identifiable partners, individuals 
may lack specific knowledge of the likely modes 
of transmission. For these reasons, criminal 
charges based on intentional or knowing expo-
sure to HIV through unsafe sexual or needle-
sharing behavior are often unsuccessful.164 
Persons act "recklessly" when they con-
sciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk (like the risk of transmitting HIV). Persons 
act "negligently" when they should be aware of 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk, but are not 
and act inconsistently with that risk. Under 
criminal law theories, individuals who disregard 
risks to others through their unsafe sexual or 
needle-sharing behaviors deviate from the stan-
dard of conduct that reasonable, law-abiding 
persons would adhere to in a similar situation. 
This deviation from an accepted standard of 
conduct may be classified as criminally reckless 
or negligent, with resulting criminal charges 
brought. Criminal charges for reckless or negli-
gent exposure to HIV may technically be 
framed against individuals who know that they 
have HIV (or are simply at high risk of HIV 
infection) and who engage in sexual or needle-
sharing activities with others (who mayor may 
not be aware of the individual's infection) for 
reasons other than intentionally or knowingly 
attempting to cause harm to another.165 
162. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-492 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-D(2) (West 1964). 
163. The estimated risk of HIV transmission for each in-
stance of intravenous needle or syringe exposure is 0.67%. 
CDC, Management of Possible Sexual, Injecting-Drug-Use, or 
Other Nonoccupational Exposure to HIV, Including Consid-
erations Related to Antiretroviral Therapy Public Health Ser-
vice Statement, 47 MMWR 1 (Sept. 25, 1998), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/mmwrI998.html. 
164. Gostin, supra note 146, at 1041, 1043. 
165. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(2) (West Supp. 
2001). 
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As with intentional and knowing offenses, 
numerous problems relate to prosecuting indi-
viduals with HIV under these theories of crimi-
nal culpability. First, it is difficult t~ s~~gest 
that sexual activity represents a sIgmficant 
deviation frem the reasonable person's stan-
dard of conduct. Sexual activity is a common 
behavioral trait. While CDC recommends sex-
ual abstinenc,:! or cessation of drug use for those 
with HIV,166 its PCRS Guidelines acknowledge 
a full range of client-centered counseling alter-
natives,167 induding the need to provide coun-
seling in methods that reduce or eliminat.e the 
risk of transmission during sexual mter-
course.168 Provided such practices are used, in-
dividuals with HIV may engage in sexual activi-
ties with little to no risk to others.169 
Second, utilizing a reckless or negligent 
standard for criminal culpability widens the 
pool of individuals who may be prosecuted. 
Under such theories, it is not necessary to show 
an individual knew he was infected with HIV 
before charg:~ng the individual with criminal 
conduct.17o 
Third, imposing a reckless or negligent 
standard fails to target individuals whose con-
duct is truly blameworthy. The breadth of such 
theories could criminalize, for example, the ac-
tivities of an individual with HIV who is en-
gaged in a long-term, consensual sexual. r~la­
tionship with another individual. Pumshmg 
individuals who lack evil or antisocial intentions 
while engaging in activities with others who are 
aware of the risks is antithetical to public health 
and criminal practice. 
Fourth, the broad use of criminal law to de-
ter individual conduct may deleteriously effect 
public health, specifically where it discoura¥~s 
at risk individuals from being tested and partlcI-
pating with PCRS. 
166. CDC, HI" COUNSELING, TESTING AND REFERRAL 
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES (1994). 
167. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2. 
168. ld. § 1.2. 
169. See id. 
170. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West Supp. 
2001). 
171. IDAHO CeDE § 39-607 (Michie 1949); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1192 (West Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-67.4:1 (Michie Supp. 2001). 
B. STD- and HIV -specific Offenses 
Many states have passed disease-specific 
laws for sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs) 
or communicable diseases in general (including 
STDs).171 These varied laws make criminal the 
knowing exposure of another to a STD (e.g. 
syphilis or gonorrhea), where the following ele-
ments are shown: (1) individual knowledge of 
infection with a STD; (2) engagement in sexual 
behavior; and (3) the failure to disclose the in-
fection to the sexual partner. l72 These statutes 
typically designate such crimes as misdemean-
ors.173 Criminal sentences for violations include 
monetary fines or short periods of imprison-
ment.174 Though the motivation for STD-spe-
cific statutes historically relates to controlling 
the spread of these diseases, these statutes are 
rarely enforced in the modern era for STDs be-
sides HIV. 
STD-specific offenses, however, may be 
charged to individuals with HIV who engage in 
unsafe sexual or needle-sharing activity in states 
where HIV is classified as a STD.175 Some 
states did not originally view HIV/AIDS as a 
STD in the traditional sense, thus presenting a 
gap in coverage for criminalizing such behaviors 
among persons with the disease. In response to 
this gap, some states created a new category of 
HIV -specific offenses. 
Dozens of states make it a crime to trans-
mit or expose others to HIV.176 While HIV-~pe­
cific statutes, like their STD counterparts, dIffer 
in scope and application across states, all of 
these laws make it a criminal offense for indi-
viduals to knowingly engage in some type of be-
havior which poses a risk of transmission of 
HIV.l77 These behaviors may include sexual in-
tercourse, needle-sharing, or otherwise attempt-
ing to transfer any "bodily fluid" to another.178 
As well, HIV -specific offenses do not generally 
require a showing of individual intent.179 The 
state need only show that an individual (1) 
knew he was infected with HIV;180 (2) engaged 
172. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-607 (Michie 1949). 
173. See id. 
174. ld. 
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 1998). 
176. CATHERINE HANSSENS, STATE CRIMINAL STATUTES 
ON HIV TRANSMISSION (1998). 
177. ld. 
178. See generally Gostin, supra note 146, at 1041. 
179. ld. 
180. [d. 
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in well-defined, risky behavior (like unsafe sex 
or needle-sharing);181 and (3) failed to inform 
his partner of the risk.182 
HIV-specific offense may carry signifi-
cantly greater penalties than STD-specific of-
fenses. Violations may constitute a felony, al-
lowing for hefty monetary fines and lengthy 
prison sentences.183 In 1998, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court, for example, upheld the convic-
tion and sentencing of a twenty-four year old 
man to thirty years in prison for knowingly 
transmitting HIV to a woman through unpro-
tected sex.184 
IV. GUIDELINES CONCERNING 
WILLFUL EXPOSURE 
As we have discussed, cases of willful expo-
sure to HIV infection through unsafe sexual or 
needle-sharing behaviors may arise under sev-
eral contexts and implicate issues related to in-
dividual privacy, partner's right to know, public 
health duties, and criminal sanctions.185 Not all 
instances of willful exposure require affirmative 
public health action beyond traditional counsel-
ing and education services. PCRS counselors 
may not need to act further when these mea-
sures abate a public health threat related to an 
isolated case of willful exposure, either through 
a change in the behavior of the individual who 
exposed others or through the adoption of safe 
practices by the partner of such individual. Per-
sistent, systematic behaviors of some individu-
als who may intend to infect others may, how-
ever, place PCRS counselors in a precarious 
position between respecting individual rights 
and protecting public health. Many of these 
cases will inevitably involve some difficult 
trade-ofts on a per case basis. Some basic legal, 
ethical, and practical recommendations that 
public health departments and PCRS counsel-
ors should consider in handling cases of willful 
exposure, however, are summarized below. 
1. Develop a Public Health Plan. Public 
health departments in conjunction with local 
PCRS counselors should develop a set of stan-
dards and procedures applicable to most cases 
of willful exposure. This plan may help clarify 
public health duties and responsibilities and re-
181. [d. 
182. [d. 
183. IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Michie 1949). 
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duce the opportunity for ill-advised responses. 
Law enforcement, mental health, and other rel-
evant authorities at the state and federal levels 
should be consulted during the development of 
this plan to facilitate the assignment of respon-
sibilities. 
2. Determine Through Investigation the Ex-
istence of a Health Threat. Public health action 
related to cases of willful exposure should not 
be based on mere conjecture or unsubstantiated 
statements. Public health departments and 
their agents must be prepared to show the exis-
tence of a health threat resulting allegedly from 
an individual's behavior by objective scientific 
evidence from well-executed and organized epi-
demiologic investigations. The methods for 
conducting these investigations without signifi-
cantly infringing on individual privacy should 
constitute a portion of the public health plan 
(above) and be consistent with further recom-
mendations. 
3. Create Strong Protections for Privacy and 
Security of Public Health Information Related to 
Investigations of Cases of Willful Exposure. In-
formation acquired or used as part of formal 
and informal public health investigations of 
cases of willful exposure is highly sensitive. 
Public health departments must not disclose 
this information to anyone from outside the de-
partment (or the circle of governmental author-
ities engaged in the investigation) unless those 
persons have a compelling need for the infor-
mation. Unwarranted disclosures, even if made 
in the auspices of protecting public health, may 
still violate federal and state privacy and an-
tidiscrimination laws. 
4. Seek Legal Assistance. The moment an 
actual case of willful exposure is detected by 
PCRS counselors or public health departments, 
legal counsel should be consulted to determine 
appropriate courses of action. State laws con-
cerning the privacy of health information and 
the duties of HCWs and others to warn persons 
at risk of infection vary significantly. Counsel, 
who are familiar with each state's laws and reg-
ulations, should assist the department in consid-
ering options for action, if necessary, without vi-
olating individual constitutional rights or 
184. Lynda Richardson, Wave of Laws Aimed at People 
with H.!. V., N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at AI. 
185. See infra Parts II - III. 
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subjecting the department or its officials to civil 
or criminal liability. 
5. Pre-e}(amine the Public Health Impact of 
Actions Taken. After consulting with legal 
counsel and before taking any action to avert 
such a risk to the public health, an expert as-
sessment should be made of the likely public 
health impact such action may have in the com-
munity based in part on the results of similar 
actions in other cases. Immediate risks to iden-
tifiable members of the community resulting 
from a case of willful exposure must be bal-
anced against potential future risks to the public 
health resulti,ng from improper, excessive, or 
unintended actions. Individuals with prior 
knowledge in handling cases of willful exposure 
should be consulted. 
6. Advise the Individual Before Public Ac-
tions Are Taken. To the extent possible, an indi-
vidual who is allegedly engaging in the willful 
exposure of others to HIV should be notified of 
the public health department's planned course 
of action. Such individuals are entitled to know 
of the action!; taken in order to exercise their 
legal and eth:lcal rights and potentially protect 
themselves against potential retribution by ag-
grieved individuals. 
7. Choose the Least Restrictive Alternative. 
These standard procedures and options must be 
exercised in accordance with a graded series of 
less restrictive alternatives.186 The public health 
plan should require PCRS counselors to choose 
the least restrictive alternative to accomplish 
the public health goal. Increasingly serious in-
terventions should be deployed only when less 
restrictive alternatives have failed to avert an 
identifiable ri:;k to the public health. 
8. Be Cmltious About Disclosing Informa-
tion. When action is deemed necessary, how-
ever, there are three general options which a 
public health department or PCRS counselor 
may take in n::sponse to a demonstrated case of 
willful exposure of others to HIV. They may 
disclose information about the exposure(s) to 
(1) persons potentially at risk; (2) criminal jus-
tice, law enforcement, or other state or local au-
thorities; or (3) the media. 
186. The first of these alternatives may likely be to contact 
the individual allegedly exposing others to infection, attempt 
to coun.;el the individual on the need to practice safe sexual 
Any known partners of an individual who 
willfully exposes others to HIV should be spe-
cifically notified and counseled to practice safe 
sexual and needle-sharing practices as soon as 
possible provided the identity and other infor-
mation concerning the individual allegedly re-
sponsible for the exposure is kept confidential. 
If the identities of the sexual and needle-sharing 
partners of such individuals are not easily veri-
fied or obtainable at all, a public health depart-
ment may have to consider other options. 
A more difficult decision arises when a 
case of willful exposure reveals that designated 
persons may be exposed to infection in the fu-
ture without their knowledge. For example, a 
public health investigation may conclude that 
an individual with HIV targets single women at 
a local college. Deciding whether to notify the 
community of persons at risk is highly complex. 
Public health departments must weigh the ben-
efits to the group, less restrictive alternatives, 
and the impact on public health efforts. In 
other cases, the class of individuals, however, 
may be too diverse or large to reach through 
specific notices (e.g., an individual targets mar-
ried women in a large metropolitan area). 
Other options may need to be considered in 
these cases, including providing specific notice 
to the affected population of the general threat 
of the spread of communicable disease through 
unsafe sexual activity. 
To avert the risks to a population or identi-
fiable individuals, PCRS counselors and public 
health departments may need to alert criminal 
justice, law enforcement, or other state or local 
authorities (e.g. substance abuse counselors, 
mental health practitioners, or state health care 
workers) of an individual's criminal behavior. 
This option should be pursued only with com-
pelling evidence of a significant and imminent 
danger to the public health or identifiable per-
sons and if there are no less intrusive ways to 
avert the harm. Such notices should only be 
made after (a) confirming the identity of the in-
dividual allegedly willfully exposing others; (b) 
confirming the individual's intention to further 
expose others to HIV (whether by direct evi-
dence or compelling circumstantial evidence 
and needle-sharing behaviors, and obtain the identity of his 
partners for purposes of notification. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 62 2001-2002
62 
such as a demonstrated pattern of exposures); 
(c) consulting legal counsel to examine whether 
state privacy or public health law allows the re-
lease of identifiable public health information 
to such entities by public health departments; 
and (d) examining the public health impact of 
such disclosure. 
While public health departments may ini-
tially assist a criminal investigation with such in-
formation, they should not provide any addi-
tional assistance or become inter-meshed or 
associated with the criminal investigation. Pub-
lic health authorities must avoid at all costs an 
image in the community as actively assisting in 
the criminal investigation of persons.187 
There may even be instances where disclo-
sure of individually-identifiable information to 
local media may be warranted, but these are ex-
tremely rare. Such disclosures of individual in-
formation are the most offensive to principles 
of individual privacy and are usually more ex-
tensive than needed. Broadcast and print me-
dia may help to serve the public health objec-
tive of warning diverse groups or larger 
populations of known risks resulting from indi-
viduals who willfully expose others to HIV, or 
assisting with the collection of information 
about such cases. However, disclosures of sensi-
tive information to the media, such as a per-
son's HIV status and name, identity, or picture, 
may present more opportunity for harm than 
public health good. Media sources may unfairly 
depict individual behavior, improperly report 
the circumstances of a given case, initiate their 
own investigations of individual conduct, arouse 
needless fear among populations, and otherwise 
187. Occasionally, law enforcement authorities may ap-
proach public health departments with requests for informa-
tion related to separate investigations of cases of willful ex-
posure. While the circumstances underlying such requests 
vary and the degree to which such information may be pro-
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deplete public health resources by manufactur-
ing ill-advised public health responses (such as 
mass HIV testing) among populations to an 
otherwise legitimate though limited public 
health threat. 
V. CONCLUSION 
PCRS counselors and local public health 
departments may uncover cases of willful expo-
sure of HIV as part of their broader roles in 
protecting the public health. Each incident 
presents counselors with a difficult series of 
choices. Should the privacy rights of an individ-
ual who intentionally tries to infect others be 
respected through PCRS, or should the right to 
know of unsuspecting partners predominate? 
Does the mission of public health suggest a role 
for these public health authorities to abate will-
ful exposures of HIV? Criminal remedies may 
be available-should these be pursued and by 
whom? When should disclosures of sensitive 
public health information be made? Without 
dictating the actions of PCRS counselors con-
cerning these cases, we have attempted to guide 
their responses through information and pro-
cess-oriented recommendations. Ultimately, 
each case of willful exposure may need to be 
addressed on ~ case by case basis. Like the dis-
ease itself, however, exposure of unknowing 
persons to HIV through the intentional risky 
behaviors of infected individuals is a largely 
preventable public health problem which re-
quires an educated, informed, and guided pub-
lic health response. 
vided depends greatly on state laws, public health depart-
ments generally should resist providing authorities any iden-
tifiable information in the absence of a compelling public 
health purpose. 
